Does It Stay, or Does It Go?: Application of the Good-Faith Exception When the Warrant Relied Upon Is Fruit of the Poisonous Tree by Cox, Alyson M.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 72 | Issue 3 Article 14
Summer 6-1-2015
Does It Stay, or Does It Go?: Application of the
Good-Faith Exception When the Warrant Relied
Upon Is Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Alyson M. Cox
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alyson M. Cox, Does It Stay, or Does It Go?: Application of the Good-Faith Exception When the Warrant




Does It Stay, or Does It Go?: 
Application of the Good-Faith Exception 
When the Warrant Relied Upon Is Fruit 
of the Poisonous Tree 
Alyson M. Cox* 
Table of Contents 
 I. Introduction ................................................................... 1506 
 II. Background Law ............................................................ 1510 
  A. The Exclusionary Rule ............................................ 1510 
  B. The Fruit-of-the-Poisonous-Tree Doctrine .............. 1512 
  C. The Good-Faith Exception ....................................... 1513 
 III. Problem at Issue ............................................................ 1515 
  A. Circuits That Have Held the Good-Faith  
   Exception Applies .................................................... 1515 
   1. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ...... 1515 
   2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ....... 1518 
  B. Circuits That Have Held the Good-Faith  
   Exception Does Not Apply ....................................... 1523 
   1. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ...... 1523 
   2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh  
    Circuit ................................................................ 1525 
  C. Circuits That Have Held Both Ways ....................... 1527 
   1. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second  
    Circuit ................................................................ 1527 
   2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth  
    Circuit ................................................................ 1530 
                                                                                                     
 * Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 
2016. I would like to thank Professor Jon Shapiro for serving as my Note advisor 
and providing valuable input from a practitioner’s perspective; Michael Finnell 
for reviewing multiple drafts and offering indispensible advice; and finally, my 
family and friends for their constant encouragement. 
1506 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1505 (2015) 
 IV. The Importance of Resolving the Current Circuit  
  Split ................................................................................ 1533 
 V. Resolution ...................................................................... 1537 
  A. Good-Faith Execution of the Original Search  
   or Seizure ................................................................. 1537 
  B. Different Groups of Officers Conducted  
   the Searches ............................................................. 1540 
  C. Good-Faith Reliance Under Leon ............................ 1542 
  D. Counterarguments ................................................... 1544 
 VI. Conclusion ...................................................................... 1547 
I. Introduction 
Consider the following scenario. During his evening patrol, 
Officer Jones pulls over a car for speeding. After approaching the 
driver’s window, Officer Jones notices the driver quickly put out a 
lit item. Immediately suspicious, the officer asks the man what he 
had been smoking, to which he replies, “None of your business.” 
Officer Jones searches the man’s car for what he suspects to be 
marijuana. Though the officer does not locate any marijuana, he 
finds large bags of cocaine under the car’s rear seats.  
Based on the quantity of cocaine located in the man’s car, 
Officer Jones suspects the man’s connection with a significant 
cocaine distribution ring recently discovered in the area. Thus, he 
decides to obtain a warrant to search the man’s residence. Officer 
Jones presents an affidavit to the magistrate describing the events 
that led to his discovery of the cocaine. He gives the magistrate 
little detail, other than noting his assumption that the man had 
put out a hand-rolled joint. The magistrate issues a search 
warrant.  
Officer Jones and a few other police officers conduct a search 
of the man’s home pursuant to the issued warrant.1 The officers 
discover hundreds of pounds of cocaine throughout the apartment. 
The officers arrest the man and charge him with possession with 
                                                                                                     
 1. For the purposes of this Note’s analysis, assume that a court would 
determine that a sufficient nexus existed between the man’s car and his home to 
validate issuance of the warrant, based on the amount of cocaine found and the 
ongoing, large-scale narcotics investigation.   
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the intent to distribute a controlled substance. During pre-trial 
proceedings, defense counsel files a motion to suppress evidence 
obtained from the defendant’s residence. Counsel argues that the 
search warrant is based on information obtained in an 
unconstitutional search of the defendant’s car. The court 
determines that this original search was unconstitutional, but 
Officer Jones and the other officers relied upon the search warrant 
in good faith in searching the defendant’s residence.  
The court now has a decision to make. After concluding that 
the initial search of the defendant’s car was unconstitutional, the 
court must determine whether the cocaine found within the 
defendant’s home is constitutionally admissible as evidence 
against him. The court can either exclude the evidence as fruit-of-
the-poisonous-tree pursuant to Officer Jones’s original 
unconstitutional search, or admit the evidence due to the officers’ 
good-faith reliance on the search warrant. In order to resolve this 
issue, one must examine implications of the exclusionary rule2 and 
the good-faith exception3 with respect to this scenario.  
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to influence police 
behavior and deter unlawful police conduct in order to protect 
citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.4 The Supreme Court has 
determined that when officers act in good-faith reliance on a search 
warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, the good-
faith exception applies and the exclusionary rule is to be 
disregarded because such situations do not serve the primary 
                                                                                                     
 2. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1855 (9th ed. 2009) (“A rule that excludes 
or suppresses evidence obtained in violation of an accused person’s constitutional 
rights.”); see also Michael J. Reed, Jr., Florida v. Bostick: The Fourth Amendment 
Takes a Back Seat to the Drug War, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 825, 836 n.109 (1993) 
(“The exclusionary rule refers to the legal requirement that any evidence obtained 
in an illegal manner be excluded at trial regardless of how reliable the evidence 
may be.”).  
 3. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1980 (“An exception to 
the exclusionary rule whereby evidence obtained under a warrant later found to 
be invalid (esp. because it is not supported by probable cause) is nonetheless 
admissible if the police reasonably relied on the notion that the warrant was 
valid.”).  
 4. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–21 (1984) (explaining the 
main purpose of the exclusionary rule); Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, 
Crim. Proc. § 3.1, at 107 (2d ed. 1992) (“The deterrence of unreasonable searches 
and seizures is a major purpose of the exclusionary rule . . . .” (quoting Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960))).  
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purpose of the exclusionary rule.5 Consequently, when 
determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule, courts must 
consider whether its purpose is met.6 
The application of the exclusionary rule requires a fact-specific 
analysis.7 The resolution of whether evidence should be excluded 
in Officer Jones’s scenario largely hinges on who is at fault for the 
tainted warrant: the magistrate judge for incorrectly concluding 
that probable cause existed when it actually did not;8 or the police 
officer, for committing an unconstitutional search or seizure or 
intentionally presenting tainted evidence to the magistrate.9 
Circuit courts rule differently in similar fact scenarios regarding 
whether the officers who applied for the search warrant must be 
an entirely separate group from those who committed the initial 
unconstitutional act.10 Circuit courts are also split on whether the 
good-faith exception applies in any instance where evidence 
obtained pursuant to an unconstitutional search or seizure taints 
a subsequent warrant.11  
                                                                                                     
 5. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919–21 (noting that exclusion of the evidence in 
such instances in no way furthers the exclusionary rule’s purpose).   
 6. See Stanley Ingber, Defending the Citadel: The Dangerous Attack of 
“Reasonable Good Faith,” 36 VAND. L. REV. 1511, 1517–18 (1983) (“[B]efore a 
decision to exclude evidence is justifiable a court must answer the following two 
questions: First, will the suppression of evidence in a specific case enhance 
deterrence of illegal police behavior? Second, is the deterrence sufficient to 
outweigh the damage to other goals of the criminal justice system?”).  
 7. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 (“[S]uppression of evidence obtained pursuant 
to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those 
unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary 
rule.”). 
 8. See id. at 921 (“Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather 
than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth 
Amendment violations.”).  
 9. See id. at 916 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police 
misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”).  
 10. Compare United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 566 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“More importantly, the officers who sought and executed the search warrants 
were not the same officers who performed the initial warrantless search, and 
Officer Murphy’s warrant affidavit fully disclosed to a neutral and detached 
magistrate the circumstances surrounding the initial warrantless search.”), with 
United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 527–28 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying the good-
faith exception when the same group of officers who conducted the 
unconstitutional seizure filed the affidavit seeking a search warrant).  
 11. See infra Part III (demonstrating the circuit split between the Fifth and 
Sixth Circuits, which apply the exception, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, which 
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This Note evaluates the circuit split regarding the interaction 
between the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and the 
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. Additionally, this Note argues 
that the good-faith exception should apply when officers rely on a 
warrant contaminated by an unconstitutional search or seizure 
only when (1) the officers who executed the original 
unconstitutional search or seizure did so in good faith;12 (2) the 
officers who applied for the warrant and executed the search 
pursuant to it were not in any capacity the same officers who 
committed the initial unconstitutional act (unless certain 
specifically delineated circumstances are present); and (3) the 
                                                                                                     
do not apply the exception, and the Second and Eighth Circuits, which vary in 
their conclusions); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155 (1978) (noting 
that this issue does not matter if the affidavit contained sufficient evidence when 
the tainted evidence is removed to nevertheless establish probable cause). 
 12. In essence, this prong of the proposed test requires the initial search or 
seizure to itself be valid and its evidence admissible. If officers conducted the 
original search pursuant to a warrant, statute, or administrative order that is 
later deemed unconstitutional, their reliance must have been in good faith under 
the mandates of Leon. If, however, the officers conducted the original search 
without a warrant, and this warrantless search was actually unreasonable and 
thus unconstitutional, the officers must have subjectively believed that the act 
was reasonable and this mistake must have been “understandable” and a 
“reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time.” See Hill v. 
California, 401 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1971) (upholding a search incident to arrest 
even though the arrest was made of the wrong person). In Hill, the officers 
believed one man was another in good faith and arrested the wrong man by 
mistake. Id. Although the court determined that their subjective good faith would 
not alone justify the warrantless search, it asserted that “sufficient probability, 
not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment 
and on the record before us the officers’ mistake was understandable and the 
arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time.” Id. The 
Supreme Court has noted on multiple occasions that 
in order to satisfy the ‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual 
determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the 
government—whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the police 
officer executing a warrant, or the police officer conducting a search or 
seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement—is not 
that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.  
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990). “Because many situations which 
confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the 
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to 
their conclusions of probability.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 
(1949).  
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officers relied on the issued warrant in good faith, based on United 
States v. Leon.13 For the purposes of this proposed test, this Note 
will assume that the warrant relied upon did not contain sufficient 
information to establish probable cause absent the tainted 
evidence.14 Additionally, it will presuppose that the officers were 
not deliberately dishonest in the affidavit presented to the 
magistrate.15 
Part II discusses the relevant background law, including the 
legal basis for the exclusionary rule, the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree 
doctrine, and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.16 
Part III examines the circuit split at issue.17 Finally, Part IV 
proposes a novel test for determining the application of the good-
faith exception under these circumstances.18 
II. Background Law 
A. The Exclusionary Rule 
The exclusionary rule, established in Weeks v. United States,19 
operates as a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent 
effect.”20 In Weeks, the defendant was charged with mailing lottery 
tickets.21 The United States District Court for the Western District 
of Missouri denied his motion to suppress evidence seized in a 
warrantless search of his bedroom.22 The Supreme Court reversed, 
                                                                                                     
 13. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 14. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984) (establishing the 
independent source doctrine).  
 15. See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (refusing to admit 
evidence when the affidavit was based on intentional misrepresentations made 
by law enforcement). 
 16. See infra Part II (setting forth the background law section of the Note).   
 17. See infra Part III (delineating the circuit split on this issue).  
 18. See infra Part IV (outlining this Note’s argument concerning whether the 
good-faith exception should be applied and if so, what test courts should invoke).   
 19. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).  
 20. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). 
 21. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386 (stating that Weeks was convicted at the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri). 
 22. See id. at 387–88 (“[W]hile plaintiff was absent . . . certain officers of the 
government . . . unlawfully and without warrant or authority so to do, broke open 
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however, finding that the evidence should have been suppressed 
because otherwise, the “Fourth Amendment . . . is of no value, 
and . . . might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”23 Thus, 
the Weeks Court demonstrated the importance of maintaining 
balance between strict police enforcement and zealous protection 
of citizens’ constitutional rights. To remedy a Fourth Amendment 
violation, courts must exclude evidence gained from illegal 
searches and seizures.24 
In Mapp v. Ohio,25 the Supreme Court extended Weeks’s 
exclusionary rule to state officials.26 Noting the magnitude of the 
Fourth Amendment in connection with citizens’ liberties, the Court 
adamantly reemphasized that the Fourth Amendment applies to 
all government invasions of citizens’ homes and private realms 
because the problem “is the invasion of his indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty and private property.”27 Since 
the establishment of the exclusionary rule in Weeks and its 
extension to the states in Mapp, the Court has attempted to strike 
an ideal balance between effective police enforcement and the 
defense of citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. In response to this 
goal, the Court has gradually accepted various exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule, to the point that some commentators believe the 
rule to be essentially lifeless.28 The Supreme Court permitted the 
                                                                                                     
the door to plaintiff's said home and seized . . . [his belongings] . . . in violation 
of . . . the 4th and 5th Amendments.”).  
 23. See id. at 391–93 (“This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of 
crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all 
entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws.”).     
 24. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 (“As with any remedial device, the application 
of the [exclusionary] rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial 
objectives are thought most efficaciously served.”).  
 25. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
 26. See id. at 656 (“This Court has not hesitated to enforce as strictly against 
the States as it does against the Federal Government the rights of free speech 
and of a free press, the rights to notice and to a fair, public trial . . . .” (citation 
omitted)).  
 27. Id. at 646–47 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).  
 28. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2511 (1996) 
(“Whether or not one agrees with the Court’s calculus, it is apparent that the sum 
of the exceptions generated in the name of finetuning deterrence has created a 
Fourth Amendment enforcement regime quite different from the one imagined by 
the Warren Court in Mapp and the early post-Mapp days.”); Myron W. Orfield, 
Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago 
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greatest and most far-reaching exception to the exclusionary rule 
in United States v. Leon:29 the good-faith exception.30 This 
exception led to the scenarios specifically addressed by this Note 
and will be dealt with in greater detail below. 
B. The Fruit-of-the-Poisonous-Tree Doctrine 
The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine works in concert with 
the exclusionary rule to exclude secondary evidence obtained as 
“fruit” of an unconstitutional act, as opposed to evidence with a 
primary relationship with the unconstitutional conduct.31 The 
Supreme Court set forth this doctrine32 in Nardone v. United 
States.33 In Nardone, the government had obtained evidence in its 
case against the defendant for fraud through the use of intercepted 
telephone messages.34 The Supreme Court affirmed the crucial 
balance between effective police enforcement and the protection of 
Fourth Amendment rights through its conclusion that evidence 
seized pursuant to an unconstitutional search or seizure cannot be 
used against defendants in any fashion, including evidence 
acquired as a result of the initial constitutional violation.35 In sum, 
the fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine holds that “evidence 
unlawfully obtained, including all derivative evidence flowing from 
                                                                                                     
Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1019 (1987) (“It now appears that only 
powerful evidence of the rule’s deterrent effect will save it from further dilution.”). 
 29. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 30. See infra Part II.C (explaining the good-faith exception in-depth).  
 31. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 
3 CRIM. PROC. § 9.3(a) (3d ed. 2014) (explaining the function of the fruit-of-the-
poisonous-tree doctrine in relation to the exclusionary rule). 
 32. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1948 (“The rule that 
evidence derived from an illegal search, arrest, or interrogation is inadmissible 
because the evidence (the ‘fruit’) was tainted by the illegality (the ‘poisonous 
tree’).”); see also STEPHEN E. ARTHUR & ROBERT S. HUNTER, 1 FEDERAL TRIAL 
HANDBOOK: CRIMINAL § 33:8 (4th ed. 2014) (“[U]nder the ‘fruit of 
the poisonous tree’ doctrine, evidence which is located by the police as a result of 
information or leads obtained from illegally seized evidence is inadmissible in a 
criminal prosecution.”).  
 33. 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
 34. Id. at 339.  
 35. Id. at 340–41.   
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it, should be suppressed.”36 The Supreme Court has created three 
exceptions to the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, including the 
independent source doctrine,37 the inevitable discovery doctrine,38 
and the dissipation of the taint doctrine.39 Some scholars pose that 
the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine has been substantially 
eroded by these various limitations.40 
C. The Good-Faith Exception 
The Supreme Court established the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon.41 Leon held that the 
                                                                                                     
 36. United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984)). 
 37. See Gary D. Spivey, “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” Doctrine Excluding 
Evidence Derived From Information Gained in Illegal Search, 43 A.L.R.3D 385, at 
I.2a (1978) (“The independent source limitation thus recognizes that proffered 
evidence which is the product of concurrent, independently conducted 
investigative processes is not inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine merely because one of the investigative processes was conducted in an 
unlawful manner.”). See generally 2 CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.02(2) 
(2015) (explaining the origin and reasoning behind the independent source 
doctrine). 
 38. See Martin J. McMahon, What Circumstances Fall Within “Inevitable 
Discovery” Exception to Rule Precluding Admission, in Criminal Case, of Evidence 
Obtained in Violation of Federal Constitution, 81 A.L.R. FED. 331, at I.2 (1978) 
(“The ‘inevitable discovery’ rule, based on what the police would have discovered 
eventually, has allowed information obtained in an unlawful search . . . to be 
admitted, where the evidence would have been discovered in any event through 
lawful means, even if there had been no violation of a constitutional provision.”). 
See generally CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 37 (delineating the 
rationale and justification for this exception).  
 39. See CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 37, at I.2 (“[T]he causal 
connection between the evidence and the illegality is so attenuated as to dissipate 
the taint.”); Segura, 468 U.S. at 829 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)) (“[T]he notion of the dissipation of the taint 
attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police 
action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no 
longer justifies its cost.”). 
 40. See generally Mark E. Cammack, The Rise and Fall of the Constitutional 
Exclusionary Rule in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 631 (2010) (“Over the 
past fifty years, however, the constitutional foundations of the exclusionary rules 
have shifted and their scope has narrowed.”); Alan Copelin, A Time to Act: 
Statutory Exceptions to State-Created Exclusionary Rules, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 339 
(1993) (“Clearly the deterrent effect of the exclusionary remedy has been diluted 
by its limitation in scope and its exceptions.”). 
 41. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Justice White delivered the majority opinion of the 
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exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by a police 
officer who conducts a search in reasonable reliance on a search 
warrant issued by a neutral, detached magistrate, which is later 
determined to be unsupported by probable cause.42 In order to 
resolve the issue of whether or not the exclusionary rule should 
apply, the Court “consider[ed] once again the tension between the 
sometimes competing goals of, on the one hand, deterring official 
misconduct and removing inducements to unreasonable invasions 
of privacy and, on the other, establishing procedures under which 
criminal defendants are ‘acquitted or convicted on the basis of all 
the evidence which exposes the truth.’”43 
The Court asserted that the good-faith exception does not 
resolve whether a constitutional right has been violated.44 Rather, 
the exception involves a judicial determination that exclusion of 
evidence does not advance the interest of deterring unlawful police 
conduct and thus does not serve the main purpose of the 
exclusionary rule.45 Despite affirming the good-faith exception’s 
existence, the Court described four hypothetical situations in 
which application of the exception would be inappropriate: (1) “if 
the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by 
information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would 
have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the 
truth;”46 (2) if the “issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his 
judicial role;”47 (3) if the warrant was “so facially deficient . . . that 
                                                                                                     
Court, joined by Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor. 
Id. at 899. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented. Id. 
 42. See id. at 920–22 (“In most such cases, there is no police illegality and 
thus nothing to deter. It is the magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether 
the officer’s allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant 
comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 43. Id. at 900 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969)). 
 44. See id. at 977 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Today, for the first time, this Court holds that although the Constitution has 
been violated, no court should do anything about it at any time and in any 
proceeding.”). 
 45. See id. at 909 (majority opinion) (“[If] . . . the exclusionary rule does not 
result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation is 
unwarranted.”).  
 46. Id. at 923.  
 47. Id.  
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the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid;”48 
and (4) if the affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as 
to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”49  
The dissenting Justices voiced concerns regarding the 
exception’s potential negative effect on police behavior.50 Justice 
Brennan asserted that the good-faith exception will “encourage 
police to provide only the bare minimum of information in future 
warrant applications” because they know that if the magistrates 
grants them a warrant, “all police conduct pursuant to that 
warrant will be protected from further judicial review” if the 
circumstances surrounding the warrant’s issuance are not 
“entirely unreasonable.”51 Thus, although the Court established an 
exception to the exclusionary rule, doubts remained concerning the 
exception’s possible detrimental effect on police behavior.  
III. Problem at Issue 
A. Circuits That Have Held the Good-Faith Exception Applies 
1. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
In United States v. McClain,52 the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit confronted the issue of whether the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule permits admission of evidence 
seized pursuant to a search warrant that was based on an 
unconstitutional search or seizure.53 A police officer responded to 
a neighbor’s complaint that lights were on and activity was 
occurring at a residence that had been vacant for some time.54 
                                                                                                     
 48. Id.   
 49. Id.  
 50. See id. at 944 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Warrant Clause . . . is, or 
should be, an important working part of our machinery of government, operating 
as a matter of course to check the ‘well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous 
executive officers’ who are part of any system of law enforcement.”). 
 51. Id. at 957.  
 52. 444 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 53. See id. at 564 (outlining this issue of first impression within the context 
of the court’s good-faith exception analysis). 
 54. See id. at 559 (recounting the neighbor of 123 Imperial Point’s complaint 
that lead to the subsequent police investigation).   
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When the officer arrived at the scene, he did not notice any signs 
of movement or criminal activity in the home, but saw that the door 
was cracked open.55 After the officer’s backup arrived, they entered 
the home and found evidence of a marijuana-growing operation in 
the basement.56  
Later that night, the responding officer informed the Drug 
Task Force of this evidence, and the Task Force investigated the 
possible drug operation.57 Weeks later, a drug enforcement officer 
obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s house and five other 
properties allegedly involved.58 The warrant affidavit explicitly 
relied in part on evidence obtained during the initial warrantless 
search of the defendant’s house59 and described the circumstances 
of that search.60 When the warrants were executed, officers 
recovered 348 marijuana plants and growing equipment.61  
In determining whether to affirm the U.S. District Court for 
the Middle District of Tennessee’s suppression of evidence, the 
Sixth Circuit recognized the issue as one of first impression.62 The 
                                                                                                     
 55. See id. at 559–60 (“Although Officer Germany had seen no movement in 
or around the house, or any signs of forced entry or vandalism, or any kind of 
criminal activity, he was nevertheless concerned that the open door and the lights 
might be signs that a burglary was in progress . . . .”). 
 56. See id. (noting that the officers “observed that the windows were covered 
with inward-facing reflective paper and that a large room contained a substantial 
amount of electrical wiring connected to a junction box and what appeared to be 
plant stimulators”).  
 57. See id. (“While neither officer saw any marijuana in the house or 
observed any illegal activity, both concluded that a marijuana grow operation was 
being set up in the basement of the house.”). 
 58. See id. (stating that Officer Murphy of the drug enforcement task force 
requested the warrant after the property had been under off-and-on surveillance 
for several weeks). 
 59. The court determined that the initial warrantless search was 
unconstitutional because neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances 
justified it. See id. at 562. (“[T]he undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that 
the police did not have probable cause to believe that a burglary was in progress; 
hence there was no exigency as a consequence of the possible burglary such 
that Johnson would support the warrantless entry.”).  
 60. Id.   
 61. See id. at 559–61 (noting that the federal grand jury indicted the three 
defendants for “conspiring to manufacture and to possess with intent to distribute 
more than 1,000 marijuana plants . . . manufacturing and possessing with intent 
to distribute 1,000 or more marijuana plants . . . ; and possessing with intent to 
distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana . . . .”). 
 62. See id. at 564 (“[W]e must reconcile the ‘good faith’ exception established 
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court adopted a two-part test for determining the admissibility of 
evidence via the good-faith exception: (1) the prior law enforcement 
conduct that uncovered evidence used in the affidavit for the 
warrant must be “close enough to the line of validity” that an 
objectively reasonable officer preparing the affidavit or executing 
the warrant would believe that the information supporting the 
warrant was not tainted by unconstitutional conduct;63 and (2) the 
resulting search warrant must have been sought and executed by 
a law enforcement officer in good faith as prescribed by Leon.64 
Applying this test, the court ruled that the good-faith exception 
applied because the officers who sought and executed the warrants 
acted in good faith, and the facts surrounding the initial 
warrantless search were “close enough to the line of validity” to 
make reliance on the validity of the search warrants objectively 
reasonable.65 The court determined this to be “one of those unique 
cases in which the Leon good faith exception should apply despite 
an earlier Fourth Amendment violation.”66 The court specifically 
stated, “The facts surrounding these officers’ warrantless entry 
into the house . . . were not sufficient to establish probable cause 
to believe a burglary was in progress, but we do not believe that 
the officers were objectively unreasonable in suspecting that 
criminal activity was occurring.”67 The Sixth Circuit also noted, 
“[W]e find no evidence that the officers knew they were violating 
the Fourth Amendment by performing a protective sweep of the 
home.”68  
The court asserted that this inquiry is very fact-specific and 
involves an evaluation of how close the Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                     
in Leon with the ‘fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree’ doctrine first coined in Nardone v. 
United States.” (citations omitted)).  
 63. See id. at 563 (“Sometimes the line between good police work and a 
constitutional violation is fine indeed.”).  
 64. See id. at 565–66 (concluding that “despite the initial Fourth 
Amendment violation, the Leon exception bars application of the exclusionary 
rule in this case”). 
 65. See id. at 566 (“[E]vidence seized pursuant to a warrant, even if in fact 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is not subject to the exclusionary 
rule if an objectively reasonable officer could have believed the seizure valid.” 
(quoting United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir. 1989))). 
 66. Id. at 565.  
 67. Id. at 566.  
 68. Id. 
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violation was to the line of validity, based on the officer’s 
reasonable belief.69 The court also emphasized that the officers 
who conducted the search pursuant to the warrant were not the 
same as those who committed to original unconstitutional search.70 
Though the court does not mention this point until late in the 
opinion, it seems to find this fact particularly compelling. After the 
court stated that it did “not believe that the officers were 
objectively unreasonable in suspecting that criminal activity was 
occurring inside [the defendant’s] home” and found “no evidence 
that the officers knew they were violating the Fourth Amendment 
by performing a protective sweep of the home,” the court asserted 
that it was even more important that “the officers who sought and 
executed the search warrants were not the same officers who 
performed the initial warrantless search.”71 Thus, this distinction 
appears to be of vital importance to the Sixth Circuit in this case.  
2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
In United States v. Woerner,72 the defendant was convicted of 
possession and distribution of child pornography as the result of 
independent state and federal investigations monitoring peer-to-
peer file sharing.73 State police officers informed local law 
enforcement that the defendant might be distributing child 
pornography after tracing videos and pictures of minors engaged 
in sexual activity to the defendant’s computer.74 The local officers 
then conducted a search of the defendant’s computers pursuant to 
                                                                                                     
 69. The officers who conducted the original search or seizure necessarily 
could not have thought that they were violating the Constitution, and their 
actions could not have been objectively unreasonable. See id. at 565 (explaining 
that the circumstances surrounding both the unconstitutional search or seizure 
and the following issuance of the warrant must be close enough to the line of 
validity that the officers reasonably believed the initial search was appropriate 
and the warrant issued was valid).  
 70. See id. at 566 (“More importantly, the officers who sought and executed 
the search warrants were not the same officers who performed the initial 
warrantless search . . . .”). 
 71. Id. at 566. 
 72. 709 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 73. Id. at 530–31. 
 74. Id. at 531.  
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a warrant that they knew was expired.75 They found child 
pornography and arrested the defendant.76 Simultaneously, FBI 
officers obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s property after 
conducting their own undercover operation.77 Prior to conducting 
the search, the FBI agents learned of the prior search and arrest 
conducted by local officials.78 The federal agents went ahead with 
the search and seized additional evidence.79 The FBI agents then 
interviewed the defendant, and he admitted to having sexual 
relations with a minor and sharing child pornography.80 Special 
agents obtained warrants to search the defendant’s flash drive, 
external hard drive, and email accounts that had not been seized 
during prior state and federal searches.81 The FBI search warrant 
was partially based on evidence obtained during the original 
unconstitutional search committed by local law enforcement.82  
The defendant moved to suppress the emails seized during the 
execution of the expired state search warrant along with the fruits 
of that search.83 Although evidence obtained from the original 
illegal search was suppressed, the district court refused to 
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the third federal search 
                                                                                                     
 75. See id. (noting that the officers received a warrant to search the 
defendant’s property on July 6, 2010, and knew that it expired in three days, yet 
conducted the search on July 12, 2010).  
 76. Id.   
 77. Id.   
 78. See id. (stating that FBI agents were preparing to conduct their own 
search pursuant to a warrant on July 13, 2010, when they were informed of the 
local search carried out the previous day).   
 79. Id. at 532.  
 80. See id. at 531–32 (noting that the defendant made this confession the 
following day after two hours of interrogation).  
 81. See id. at 532 (referring to this as “the second federal search warrant”).  
 82. See id. at 534  
Statements made by [the defendant] during the custodial 
interrogation, which were later suppressed as fruits of the unlawful 
July 12 search, appear in . . . the warrant affidavit supporting the 
third federal search warrant. . . . [S]uch statements were the only 
evidence in the warrant affidavit specifically linking [the defendant’s] 
possession of child pornography to the fantastikaktion account. 
 83. See id. at 532–33 (stating that the court suppressed evidence seized from 
the defendant’s home and statements made to the FBI because they were tainted 
by the unconstitutional search but did not suppress evidence from the FBI’s 
interview of the victim or the later search of the defendant’s home).   
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warrant because “the evidence at issue fell within the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.”84 
In reviewing the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Texas’s denial of the defendant’s suppression motion, the Fifth 
Circuit declined to assign a categorical rule concerning application 
of the good-faith exception, but held that the good-faith exception 
applied to evidence obtained pursuant to a federal search warrant 
based on information garnered in an illegal search by state 
officers.85 The court applied the good-faith exception in this case 
partially because the federal officers were not informed of the local 
police investigation until after the original unlawful search had 
been conducted.86 Furthermore, no evidence suggested that local 
authorities intentionally sought to circumvent the exclusionary 
rule by giving the illegally obtained evidence to the FBI.87 Unlike 
in McClain,88 the local officers who conducted the original warrant 
in Woerner knew that it was invalid; thus, their search was not 
conducted in good-faith.89 However, the Fifth Circuit still affirmed 
application of the good-faith exception to the subsequent searches 
because the FBI agents were unaware of the illegality of this prior 
search and did not act negligently in their use of its fruits.90 
The Fifth Circuit noted the four situations in which the good-
faith exception does not apply, as set forth in Leon91: (1) “when the 
issuing magistrate was misled by information in an affidavit that 
the affiant knew or reasonably should have known was false;”92 
(2) “when the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial 
role;”93 (3) “when the warrant affidavit is so lacking in indicia of 
                                                                                                     
 84. Id. at 533.  
 85. See id. (stating that suppression of evidence was not justified under the 
facts of the case at hand).  
 86. Id. at 534.  
 87. Id. at 534–35.   
 88. See supra Part III.A.1 (analyzing McClain). 
 89. See United States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 527, 531 (5th Cir. 2013) (“On July 
12, 2010, believing the warrant to be expired, Rodriguez and other state officers 
executed the expired search warrant . . . .”).  
 90. See id. at 535 (noting that the FBI agents could not have known the 
tainted nature of the warrant).  
 91. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 92. Woerner, 709 F.3d at 533–34.  
 93. Id.  
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probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 
unreasonable;”94 and (4) “when the warrant is so facially deficient 
in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to 
be seized that executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to 
be valid.”95 The Fifth Circuit stated, however, that the case at hand 
“calls upon us to answer whether the good-faith exception 
applies . . . when the magistrate’s probable cause finding is based 
on evidence that was the product of an illegal search or 
seizure.”96 Allowing the good-faith exception to apply in this case, 
but declining to state a general rule, the Court noted two specific 
instances when the exception would not apply: (1) “if the officer 
applying for the warrant knew or had reason to know that the 
information was tainted and included it anyway without full 
disclosure and explanation,” or (2) “if the officer responsible for the 
illegal predicate search provided information—knowing it to be 
tainted, but concealing that fact—to a second officer for use in a 
successive search warrant application.”97  
The Fifth Circuit addressed this convergence of the fruit-of-
the-poisonous-tree doctrine and the good-faith exception again in 
United States v. Massi.98 In Massi, the Air Marine Operations 
Center requested that local police conduct a “ramp check”99 on the 
defendant’s plane while it was stopped in Texas en route from Las 
Vegas to Orlando.100 At 6:20 PM, the Homeland Security 
Investigations directorate was contacted and arrived at the 
scene.101 The defendant and his pilot refused to consent to a search 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.   
 96. See id. at 534 (noting that statements made by the defendant that were 
later suppressed as fruits of the unlawful search were included in the affidavit 
supporting the third federal search warrant and were admittedly “the only 
evidence in the warrant affidavit specifically linking [the defendant’s] possession 
of child pornography to the fantastikaktion account”).  
 97. Id.   
 98. 761 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 99. See id. at 518 (describing the ramp check procedure). 
 100. See id. at 517–18 (stating that the AMOC investigated the defendant’s 
plane because (1) it had flown from Orlando to Las Vegas, made six stops, and 
stayed in Las Vegas for only a few hours; (2) the plane’s owner was previously 
convicted of drug trafficking; and (3) the defendant had recently traveled from 
Mexico into the U.S.). 
 101. See id. at 518 (noting that the local police officers questioned the 
defendant and his pilot and asked for their documentation prior to Homeland 
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of the interior of the plane.102 Approximately one hour later, federal 
agent Howard arrived and gained permission from the U.S. 
Attorney General to request a search warrant.103 He obtained the 
signed warrant at 11:30 PM.104 Officers conducted a search 
pursuant to the warrant at midnight and found a large amount of 
marijuana.105 The officers detained the defendant during the entire 
investigation.106 The defendant argued that this lengthy detention 
amounted to an illegal seizure and “his unconstitutional detention 
taints evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant’s 
execution and that such evidence should be excluded as fruit of the 
poisonous tree.”107  
In determining whether the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Texas erred in denying the defendant’s motion 
to suppress the marijuana,108 the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the 
lack of jurisprudence on the application of the good-faith exception 
for evidence acquired based on a tainted warrant.109 As in Woerner, 
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the situation should not be viewed 
                                                                                                     
Security’s arrival).   
 102. See id. at 519 (stating that the defendant quickly attempted to shut the 
plane door, and officers noticed a large box inside of the plane, which the 
defendant initially denied knowledge of, but later admitted ownership of).  
 103. See id. (noting that Agent Howard investigated the scene for two hours 
prior to gaining permission to obtain a warrant but did not interrogate the 
defendant, though the defendant and his pilot were required to stay at the 
airport).   
 104. Id.   
 105. See id. (“Nineteen sealed bags of marijuana with a total weight of 10.50 
kilograms were found within the cardboard box. Upon this discovery, Massi and 
Sanchez were immediately arrested, informed of their rights, and taken into 
custody.”). 
 106. See id. at 517–19 (delineating the timeline of the investigation, which 
lasted approximately six hours).  
 107. See id. at 520 (noting that the defendant contended that “his detention 
was without reasonable suspicion, lacked probable cause, and was of a length that 
violated the Fourth Amendment . . . and that his unconstitutional detention 
taints evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant’s execution”). 
 108. See id. at 520 (“The court held that there was ‘initial reasonable suspicion 
to make the stop and that it developed into probable cause’ justifying continuing 
the stop.”). 
 109. See id. at 536–37 (“The question of whether the good faith exception can 
permit the admissibility of evidence over a possible taint caused by an earlier-in-
time detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment that would otherwise 
warrant exclusion as fruit of the poisonous tree, is not territory frequented in our 
jurisprudence.”).  
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as a fifth instance where the good-faith exception would not apply, 
but as a corollary to the first scenario listed in Leon, where the 
affiant misled the magistrate.110 The Fifth Circuit adopted the 
following two-part test to determine whether the good-faith 
exception should apply:  
(1) [T]he prior law enforcement conduct that uncovered 
evidence used in the affidavit for the warrant must be ‘close 
enough to the line of validity’ that an objectively reasonable 
officer preparing the affidavit or executing the warrant would 
believe that the information supporting the warrant was not 
tainted by unconstitutional conduct, and (2) the resulting 
search warrant must have been sought and executed by a law 
enforcement officer in good faith as prescribed by Leon.111 
The Fifth Circuit determined that suppressing the evidence would 
not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule because the federal 
agent in the present case “did not have the benefit of our judicial 
hindsight as he worked to obtain and execute a search 
warrant . . . .”112 Thus, the Fifth Circuit in this case essentially 
adopted the test and reasoning coined by the Sixth Circuit in 
McClain.113  
B. Circuits That Have Held the Good-Faith Exception Does Not 
Apply 
1. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
In United States v. Vasey,114 an officer pulled over the 
defendant for speeding.115 The defendant acted suspiciously, so the 
                                                                                                     
 110. Id. at 526, 531–32 (“We conclude that the issue presented by Massi’s 
circumstances is more easily considered under Leon by equating the misleading 
of the issuing magistrate as to a possible constitutional violation through an 
omission with the first Leon scenario, submission of an affidavit with 
affirmatively misleading information.”). 
 111. Id. at 528.  
 112. Id. at 532.   
 113. 444 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005); see also supra Part III.A.1. (explaining the 
test used by the Sixth Circuit). 
 114. 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 115. Id. at 784.  
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officer handcuffed him and searched his car.116 He then arrested 
the defendant due to an outstanding felony drug warrant.117 
Following the arrest, the officer asked the defendant if he could 
search the car, and the defendant denied consent.118 Nevertheless, 
after another officer arrived,119 they conducted a warrantless 
inventory search of the car.120 Based on an affidavit outlining these 
events, the officers obtained a search warrant to conduct a more 
in-depth search of the defendant’s car.121 That search unveiled 
$71,111 in cash and three kilograms of cocaine.122 
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington 
initially found that both the warrantless and warrant-backed 
searches of the defendant’s car violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.123 On the government’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that 
the initial warrantless search was unconstitutional.124 The court 
held that the subsequently obtained warrant was not supported by 
probable cause without the evidence obtained from the warrantless 
search.125 The court rejected the government’s argument that the 
                                                                                                     
 116. See id. (“As he approached the car, Officer Jensen believed he saw Vasey 
stuffing his hand between the seats and handling something furtively on the right 
rear floorboard. Vasey contends he was merely unfastening his seatbelt and 
reaching for his wallet to retrieve his license.”). 
 117. Id.   
 118. Id.   
 119. See id. (stating that the officers were suspicious that the defendant was 
engaged in drug-related activities and noticed a container of pills through the 
window, though the bottle was labeled as food supplement and the defendant told 
the officers he sold them for a living).   
 120. See id. at 784–85 (noting that the officers located $1,128 in cash on the 
defendant, and $5,000 and a gold watch underneath the driver’s seat). 
 121. Id. at 785.   
 122. Id.   
 123. See id. (finding that the warrantless search was not covered by an 
exception to the warrant requirement, and therefore the $5,000 and gold watch 
were illegally obtained, and the warrant was not supported by probable cause 
once mention of these items were excluded from the affidavit).   
 124. See id. at 787 (asserting that “the search was not properly limited to the 
area within [the defendant’s] immediate control” and thus was not allowed as 
incident to arrest, nor was the search protected by the prophylactic rule because 
the officers conducted the search thirty to forty-five minutes after the defendant’s 
arrest).  
 125. See id. (“[I]nclusion of tainted evidence in an affidavit does not, by itself, 
taint the warrant or the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. . . . A reviewing 
court should excise the tainted evidence and determine whether the remaining, 
untainted evidence would provide a neutral magistrate with probable cause to 
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good-faith exception should protect evidence obtained pursuant to 
the search warrant.126  
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Vasey from Leon by 
emphasizing that the officer in Leon acted in good faith both when 
obtaining the evidence and presenting it to the magistrate.127 The 
Ninth Circuit noted that in Leon “[t]he only error in the entire 
process was the magistrate’s erroneous finding that the evidence 
established probable cause.”128 The officer in Vasey, however, 
conducted an illegal warrantless search, which the magistrate 
knew of, and the magistrate issued the warrant partially based on 
the tainted evidence from the initial illegal search.129 Therefore, 
the court refused to apply the good-faith exception because 
application of the exclusionary rule would deter intentionally 
unconstitutional police conduct.130  
2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
In United States v. McGough,131 the Eleventh Circuit 
addressed the issue of whether the good-faith exception applied 
when a prior unconstitutional search of the defendant’s residence 
tainted the subsequently obtained search warrant.132 Officers 
responded to the defendant’s apartment pursuant to an accidental 
call by the defendant’s daughter, who had been locked inside the 
apartment while the defendant went to pick up pizza.133 When the 
                                                                                                     
issue a warrant.”).  
 126. See id. at 789 (“This argument is without merit. . . . The Leon analysis 
and good-faith exception are not applicable to this case.”).  
 127. See id. (“The evidence obtained in the warrant search was deemed 
admissible by the Leon Court, however, because the officer acted in good faith.”).  
 128. Id.   
 129. See id. (“The constitutional error was made by the officer in this case, not 
by the magistrate as in Leon.”).  
 130. See id. (“The Leon Court made it very clear that the exclusionary rule 
should apply (i.e. the good-faith exception should not apply) if the exclusion of 
evidence would alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the 
policies of their department.”). 
 131. 412 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 132. See id. at 1235–36 (outlining the issues raised by the defendant on appeal 
concerning the lower court’s refusal to suppress evidence).   
 133. See id. at 1233 (stating that the five-year-old had meant to call her aunt 
and hung up when she realized that she had called 911 instead).   
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defendant returned home, officers arrested the defendant for 
reckless conduct.134 While waiting for the daughter’s aunt to 
arrive, the officers asked the defendant permission to search his 
apartment, which he refused.135 When an officer took the 
defendant’s daughter back inside to get her belongings, he noticed 
marijuana and a handgun.136 The officers then obtained a warrant 
and found more marijuana and cash within the apartment.137 The 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied the 
defendant’s motion to suppress.138 
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the officers’ re-entry into the 
apartment was unconstitutional139 and the good-faith exception 
did not apply.140 Citing Leon, the court held that the police conduct 
in this case did not qualify as “objectively reasonable law 
enforcement activity.”141 The court held that the good-faith 
exception did not apply because the officer’s entry into the 
apartment to get the defendant’s daughter’s belongings was 
objectively unreasonable.142 The Eleventh Circuit created a 
dichotomy between “objectively reasonable law enforcement 
activity” and unlawful searches and thus refused to apply the good-
faith exception where “the search affidavit was tainted with 
                                                                                                     
 134. See id. at 1234 (noting that the officers thought the defendant’s daughter 
looked scared and like she wanted to get out of the apartment).  
 135. See id. (stating that from this time forward, the defendant was in custody 
and in the back of the squad car).   
 136. See id. (asserting that the magistrate “found that there was no 
immediate threat or danger that necessitated the officers entering [the 
defendant’s] apartment”). 
 137. See id. at 1235 (stating that in total, the officers found marijuana in four 
different locations around the apartment, a 12 gauge shotgun, a .25 caliber 
handgun, several rounds of ammunition, and bags of cash).   
 138. See id. (noting that the defendant “argued that the officers had no legal 
authority to enter his apartment, and that Officer Brock’s search warrant could 
not be used to retroactively validate the prior illegal entry and search”).  
 139. See id. at 1236–39 (rejecting the government’s argument that the 
warrantless search was valid pursuant to the officers’ community caretaking 
function because no immediate threat necessitated the officers’ entry).   
 140. See id. at 1239–40 (making this determination based on a fact-specific 
analysis of the case at hand). 
 141. Id. at 1240.  
 142. See id. at 1239 (“[T]he exigencies of the situation—[the daughter’s] need 
for her shoes—are not compelling enough to find that the officers’ warrantless 
entry into [the defendant’s] apartment was objectively reasonable.”). 
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evidence obtained as a result of a prior, warrantless, 
presumptively unlawful entry into a personal dwelling.”143 The 
court excluded the evidence solely because the officers were not 
legally permitted to enter the defendant’s apartment under the 
circumstances.144 
C. Circuits That Have Held Both Ways 
1. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
In United States v. Thomas,145 eight defendants were charged 
with serious narcotics, firearm, and RICO violations.146 At trial, 
the government presented evidence obtained from nine extensive 
undercover investigations and various searches over the course of 
nine years, including searches of two of the defendants’ 
apartments.147 One of these searches was conducted pursuant to a 
warrant,148 for which probable cause was established largely due 
to a canine sniff outside the apartment.149 The officers did not 
locate narcotics in the apartment, but did obtain “papers 
pertaining to auto registration, insurance, taxes and the like” and 
a bullet-proof vest.150 The defendant claimed that the canine 
search was illegal, and therefore evidence obtained from his 
apartment should have been suppressed.151 
                                                                                                     
 143. Id. (quoting United States v. Meixner, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1078 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001)).   
 144. See id. (“The evidence obtained as a result of the police officers unlawful 
entry into [the defendant’s] apartment should be suppressed.”). 
 145. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).   
 146. Id. at 1361.  
 147. See id. at 1365 (explaining the extent of the evidence presented, 
including the testimony of 121 witnesses).  
 148. See id. at 1366 (“The underlying affidavit also stated that Wheelings had 
been identified by a reliable informant as a narcotics dealer . . . and that when 
arrested the previous day, he had quickly closed the door of his apartment behind 
him in a suspicious manner, indicating the existence inside of contraband.”).   
 149. See id. (indicating that the canine sniff alerted officers that narcotics 
were present in the apartment).   
 150. Id.   
 151. See id. at 1365–66 (stating that this claim was based on the assertion 
that untainted probable cause did not exist to issue the warrant).   
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The Second Circuit held that the dog sniff constituted an 
illegal search of the defendant’s apartment,152 and evidence 
obtained pursuant to it could not be relied upon in evaluating the 
search warrant.153 The court also found that the affidavit did not 
contain sufficient information to establish probable cause after 
removing the tainted evidence from consideration.154 Yet the court 
concluded that the good-faith exception applied to the case at hand 
because there was “nothing more the officer could have or should 
have done under these circumstances to be sure his search would 
be legal.”155 The officer brought evidence of narcotics within the 
apartment based on the canine sniff to a neutral magistrate, who 
determined that probable cause existed.156 The Second Circuit 
concluded that it was reasonable for the officer to rely upon the 
magistrate’s determination in his execution of the warrant.157  
The Second Circuit addressed this issue again in United States 
v. Reilly.158 Here, officers smelled the odor of marijuana coming 
from the defendant’s cottage on his property.159 They then found a 
clearing about one-hundred feet from the cottage that contained 
                                                                                                     
 152. See id. at 1367 (“Here the defendant had a legitimate expectation that 
the contents of his closed apartment would remain private, that they could not be 
‘sensed’ from outside his door. Use of the trained dog impermissibly intruded on 
that legitimate expectation.”). 
 153. Id.   
 154. See id. at 1368 (asserting that the “totality of the circumstances” does 
not establish probable cause in this instance).   
 155. Id. In the case at hand, the underlying illegal search consisted of a dog 
sniff outside of the defendant’s apartment. Keeping in mind the amount of 
precedent that deems dog sniffs to be less intrusive than other searches, the 
Second Circuit presumptively considered the police officers’ misunderstanding of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in this realm to be reasonable. See id. at 1366 
(“Canine sniffs are recognized as being less intrusive than a typical search used 
to determine the presence of contraband, and the practice of using trained dogs 
to sniff baggage at airports has been held not to constitute a search.”). Though 
the court ultimately held this dog sniff to be unconstitutional due to heightened 
privacy interests within the home, the importance of this element might not have 
been readily apparent to the police officers. See id. (“It is one thing to say that a 
sniff in an airport is not a search, but quite another to say that a sniff can never 
be a search. The question always to be asked is whether the use of a trained dog 
intrudes on a legitimate expectation of privacy.”).  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id.   
 158. 76 F.3d 1271 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 159. See id. at 1274 (noting that the officers visited the cottage a year earlier 
and smelled marijuana but did not enter the property because a dog was present).   
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approximately twenty marijuana plants.160 Later that day, the 
officers obtained a search warrant for the cottage and the 
defendant’s main residence and found more marijuana plants.161 
The Second Circuit first found that the officers violated the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights in their search of his 
curtilage162 and that the good-faith exception did not save the 
evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant.163 The Second Circuit 
did not overrule its decision in Thomas, but rather differentiated 
the two cases on the facts.164 Unlike the officers in Thomas, who 
presented evidence to the magistrate concerning the dog sniff in 
good faith,165 the officers in this case had every reason to know that 
the Fourth Amendment protects curtilage and “undertook a search 
that caused them to invade what they could not fail to have known 
was potentially [the defendant’s] curtilage.”166 Additionally, the 
officers failed to provide the issuing magistrate with a detailed 
account of their actions.167 Based on these facts, “there was a lot 
more the officers could have or should have done . . . to be sure 
[their] search was legal.”168  
Thus, as demonstrated by the Second Circuit’s analysis, 
evidence should not be excluded in cases where an officer does 
everything in his or her power to make sure the search is legal.169 
                                                                                                     
 160. See id. (stating that the officers left the property after finding the plants).  
 161. See id. (relaying that the officers found around fifteen marijuana plants 
in the cottage and one-hundred-and-fifteen plants growing in the wooded area). 
 162. See id. at 1276–79 (using the four elements identified in United States v. 
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987)—proximity, enclosure, use, and visibility—to 
determine whether the searched area qualified as curtilage).   
 163. See id. at 1280 (“Though we are sympathetic to the good-faith exception 
and to the notion that evidence seized under a warrant should not be excluded 
simply because the magistrate erred in issuing the warrant, we find that the good-
faith exception does not apply in this case.” (citation omitted)).   
 164. See id. at 1283 (“But this is neither the time nor the place to reconsider 
our holding in Thomas and we do not wish to do so.”).  
 165. See id. at 1281 (“[The officer in Thomas] did not have any significant 
reason to believe that what he had done was unconstitutional.”). 
 166. Id.  
 167. See id. at 1280–81 (“The affidavit gave no description of the cottage, 
pond, gazebo, or other characteristics of the area. At no time did it provide any 
information regarding distances or internal fencing.”).  
 168. Id. at 1281.  
 169. See id. at 1282 (“By recognizing that, in this case, good faith was 
precluded by the officers’ failure to provide the issuing judge with the details of 
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Therefore, according to the Second Circuit, it matters whether or 
not the warrant was received in good faith, not only relied upon in 
good faith. 170 The court emphasized that “the good-faith exception 
requires a sincerely held and objectively reasonable belief that the 
warrant is based on a valid application of the law to all the known 
facts.”171 Without information concerning the lay of the land and 
the officers’ actions, the court determined that the magistrate 
“could not possibly make a valid assessment of the legality of the 
warrant that he was asked to issue.”172 However, the Second 
Circuit did not rule that “the fruit of illegal searches can never be 
the basis for a search warrant that the police can subsequently use 
in good faith.”173 Rather, whether or not the good-faith exception 
should apply depends on which party is to blame for defects within 
the issued warrant.174  
2. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
In United States v. White,175 officers stopped the defendant at 
an airport due to his suspicious behavior.176 The defendant agreed 
to speak with them but did not allow them to search his luggage.177 
He repeatedly asked if he could leave with his luggage,178 but the 
                                                                                                     
their dubious pre-warrant conduct, we affirm the Thomas principle . . . .”). 
 170. See id. at 1280 (“Good faith is not a magic lamp for police officers to rub 
whenever they find themselves in trouble.”).  
 171. Id. at 1273.  
 172. See id. (“Here, information about the distances involved, the layout, 
conditions, and other like particulars of Reilly’s land was crucial.”).   
 173. Id. at 1280–81.  
 174. See id. at 1281 (“[I]t is one thing to admit evidence innocently obtained 
by officers who rely on warrants later found invalid due to a magistrate’s error. It 
is an entirely different matter when the officers are themselves ultimately 
responsible for the defects in the warrant.”). 
 175. 890 F.2d 1413 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 176. See id. at 1414–15 (noting that the officers observed that the defendant 
exited the flight close to last, was traveling alone, carrying a small bag, looked 
around often, and appeared nervous).   
 177. See id. at 1415 (stating that the officers told the defendant that he 
exhibited the characteristics of someone trafficking narcotics and “that the search 
would be brief”).  
 178. See id. (noting that the defendant supposedly asked to leave with his 
bags six or seven times).   
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officers told the defendant that while he was free to go, he could 
not take his bags with him.179 A dog alerted the presence of drugs 
in the carry-on bag.180 The defendant left without his luggage, and 
the officers obtained a warrant to search it the following 
morning.181 The officers found a package of cocaine in the carry-on 
bag and used that evidence to apply for a warrant to search the 
larger bag, which ultimately was found to contain no evidence of 
narcotics trafficking.182 
The Eighth Circuit held that the officers did not have an 
adequate basis to conduct a Terry stop in this case, and thus the 
detention was an unlawful seizure.183 However, the court applied 
the good-faith exception184 because “the facts of this case are close 
enough to the line of validity to make the officers’ belief in the 
validity of the warrant objectively reasonable.”185 The court held 
that “[i]t was objectively reasonable (even though legally incorrect) 
for the officers to believe that the information contained in the 
affidavit for the warrant was lawfully obtained.”186 The facts 
surrounding the original search187 were “close enough to the line of 
validity” that the court determined, despite the Fourth 
Amendment violation, the fruits of the search should be entered 
into evidence.188 The court asserted that various factors in this case 
push it “into the gray area created by Leon.”189  
                                                                                                     
 179. See id. (“The bags would have to stay in order to allow a narcotics 
detection dog to sniff them.”). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. at 1416–17 (asserting that the initial consensual encounter 
transformed into a Terry stop and the officers did not have “sufficient grounds to 
form a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity in order to detain [the 
defendant’s] bags,” though this was a “very close case”).   
 184. See id. at 1414 (upholding the district court’s refusal to suppress 
evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant).  
 185. Id. at 1419. 
 186. Id. at 1414.   
 187. See id. at 1419 (listing factors such as “[t]he purchase of the ticket for 
cash, plus the incremental effect of the other factors present in this case”).  
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
1532 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1505 (2015) 
The Eighth Circuit revisited this issue again in United States 
v. O’Neal.190 In O’Neal, officers at a bus stop watching for possible 
drug transactions approached the defendant and his brother.191 
While the suspects were being questioned, an officer seized the 
defendant’s carry-on bag in order to conduct a canine sniff test.192 
The defendant then admitted that the bag contained cocaine.193 A 
dog alerted the presence of drugs in the bag, and the officers 
obtained a search warrant, yielding cocaine.194 
The Eighth Circuit found that although the officers did not 
have sufficient reasonable suspicion to seize the defendant’s bag,195 
the defendant’s admission that drugs were in the bag provided a 
valid basis for issuance of the warrant.196 Determining the validity 
of a search warrant involves consideration of all the facts, and the 
defendant’s confession provided a sufficient basis for probable 
cause.197  
However, the Eighth Circuit found it important to note its 
rejection of the government’s good-faith argument in this case.198 
The court followed its prior ruling in White, while reaching the 
opposite outcome based on the facts at hand.199 Unlike in White, 
                                                                                                     
 190. 17 F.3d 239 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 191. See id. at 240 (stating that the defendant and his brother had traveled 
from Chicago to Minneapolis).  
 192. Id.   
 193. See id. (asserting that the defendant made this admission to another 
officer once his bag had been seized). 
 194. See id. (noting that the defendant was arrested before the officers 
obtained the search warrant).  
 195. See id. at 241–42 (“There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that [the 
defendant’s] conduct prior to the seizure was anything but unremarkable.”). 
 196. See id. at 243 (“[The defendant] does not challenge the admission on 
appeal, and we therefore must accept the lower court’s determination that the 
admission was voluntarily given in a non-custodial encounter with the police.”).  
 197. See id. at 244 (“Clearly, a voluntary statement admitting to a police 
officer that one’s bag contains drugs is adequate to support a finding of probable 
cause.”). 
 198. See id. at 243 n.6 (“The government urges on appeal that ‘even if this 
Court disagrees with the district court’s finding of a reasonable suspicion, the 
denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress should still be affirmed’ under the 
good-faith rule of United States v. Leon . . . .”). 
 199. See id. (stating that no officer could believe in good faith that the 
defendant was engaged in criminal conduct, and that “[i]f the method by which 
evidence supporting a search warrant is seized is clearly illegal . . . evidence 
obtained under the resulting warrant should be excluded”).  
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where the facts were “close enough to the line of validity” that the 
officers were entitled to a good faith belief that reasonable 
suspicion existed, the facts in O’Neal, according to the court, did 
not place the case “into the gray area created by Leon.”200 It noted 
that “[i]f the method by which evidence supporting a search 
warrant is seized is clearly illegal, then even 
under Leon and White, evidence obtained under the resulting 
warrant should be excluded.”201 The court ruled that a magistrate’s 
issuance of a search warrant could not sanitize prior illegal conduct 
when the method used to seize the evidence supporting the search 
warrant was clearly illegal.202 Noting the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule as stated in Leon, the Eighth Circuit asserted 
that police misconduct was the underlying problem in this case, 
and thus the good-faith exception should not apply.203  
IV. The Importance of Resolving the Current Circuit Split 
In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court established 
deterrence of unlawful police behavior as the main purpose of the 
exclusionary rule.204 The rule as applied should influence and 
shape law enforcement activity in order to discourage Fourth 
Amendment violations.205 The Court warned that this goal should 
                                                                                                     
 200. See id. (“No facts prior to the seizure of O’Neal’s bag could reasonably 
support the seizure. No officer could in good faith believe that the facts would lead 
a reasonable person to believe that O’Neal was involved in criminal activity.”).  
 201. Id.  
 202. See id. (asserting that the facts of this case are not close enough to the 
“line of validity” for the good-faith exception to apply). 
 203. See id. (“If clearly illegal police behavior can be sanitized by the issuance 
of a search warrant, then there will be no deterrence, and the protective aims of 
the exclusionary rule will be severely impaired if not eliminated.”).   
 204. See supra Part II.A (explaining the purpose behind the exclusionary 
rule); see also Dep’t of Justice, “Truth in Criminal Justice” Series Office of Legal 
Policy: The Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 573, 
605 (1989) (“The Leon opinion justified the creation of a ‘good faith’ exception 
almost totally with reference to deterrence, which the majority now clearly sees 
as the raison d’être of the exclusionary rule.”). 
 205. See Dep’t of Justice, supra note 204, at 577 (noting that deterrence of 
Fourth Amendment violations through removing incentive for police misconduct 
serves as the most common rationale for continuance of the exclusionary rule); 
Eugene R. Milhizer, Debunking Five Great Myths About the Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule, 211 MIL. L. REV. 211, 217 (2012) (examining specific and 
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not be pursued single-mindedly, however.206 Though exclusion of 
evidence ideally leads to reduced police misconduct, courts must 
balance this against the “substantial social costs exacted” by an 
“unbending application of the exclusionary sanction” that 
unnecessarily impedes the truth-finding function of the justice 
system.207 Thus, when applying the exclusionary rule, courts must 
balance two central interests:208 (1) the Fourth Amendment 
protections awarded to citizens, which embody deeply valued 
privacy interests, and (2) efficient and effective police 
enforcement.209 
This reasoning led the Leon Court to establish the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.210 Though deliberate and 
significant police misconduct justifies exclusion of evidence,211 the 
                                                                                                     
general deterrence implicated by the exclusion of evidence illegally gathered); 
Thomas K. Clancy, Extending the Good Faith Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule to Warrantless Seizures That Serves as a Basis 
for the Search Warrant, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 712 (1995) (“[T]he purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to promote specific and systemic deterrence.”).  
 206. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking 
the Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J. 483, 490–91 
(2006) (“To let the guilty go free . . . because of the defense’s using the hammer of 
the suppression motion to enhance its defense bargaining power 
would . . . generate disrespect for the law and administration of justice, at least 
where police transgressions . . . were done in objectively reasonable good faith.” 
(internal quotation omitted)); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490–91 (1976) (“Thus, 
although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part through the 
nurturing of respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it 
may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and 
administration of justice.”). 
 207. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (quoting United States 
v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)). 
 208. See id. (“[The Court] has evaluated suppression questions by weighing 
whether exclusion in a particular context would result in sufficient deterrence of 
future misconduct to counterbalance the cost to society in freeing the guilty. It 
was exactly this ‘balancing’ approach that led to the ‘good faith’ exceptions in 
Sheppard and Leon.”); Gretchan R. Diffendal, Application of the Good-Faith 
Exception in Instances of a Predicate Illegal Search: “Reasonable” Means Around 
the Exclusionary Rule? 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 217, 233 (1994) (“The deterrent effect 
should be balanced against the cost of suppressing the evidence, and the good-
faith exception should apply only when there would be no dissuasive effect on the 
officer’s behavior.”).  
 209. Id. 
 210. See Part II.C (explaining the good-faith exception as established in Leon).   
 211. See Milhizer, supra note 205, at 217 (“[B]ecause police are ‘engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’ the threat that illegally 
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exclusionary rule’s goal of deterrence is not served when officers 
rely on a warrant in objective good faith.212 Rather, this would only 
deter police officers from fulfilling their duties.213 The Court noted 
that “[w]here the official action was pursued in complete good 
faith . . . the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.”214 Thus, 
the good-faith exception maintains the same purpose as its parent, 
the exclusionary rule. Both doctrines aim to positively influence 
police behavior and strike an ideal balance between the protection 
of Fourth Amendment rights and effective law enforcement.215  
Consequently, the current circuit split bears real and practical 
implications regarding police action.216 When courts apply the 
good-faith exception to cases where warrants are fruit of the 
poisonous tree, concerns arise regarding whether this behavior can 
be, and should be, deterred. This inconsistency in federal case law 
has existed for years,217 but the split has perpetuated this issue 
                                                                                                     
gathered evidence would be excluded will restrain egregious ferreting and cause 
police to stay within constitutional bounds.”).   
 212. But see Leon, 468 U.S. at 955 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
good-faith exception will encourage police ignorance of the Fourth Amendment). 
This concern of Justice Brennan’s must be kept in mind while fashioning tests 
concerning when the good-faith exception applies. Proposed tests must strike a 
balance between effective police enforcement and protection of Fourth 
Amendment rights, and not neglect the fervent guarding of citizens’ rights, as was 
Justice Brennan’s concern in adopting the good-faith exception. See id. at 960 (“In 
time this or some later Court will restore these precious freedoms to their rightful 
place as a primary protection for our citizens against overreaching officialdom.”).  
 213. See Taslitz, supra note 206, at 492 (“Similarly, police who act in good 
faith could not have, and therefore will not in the future have, their behavior 
altered by suppression, unless exclusion makes them less willing to do their duty, 
an undesirable outcome.”).   
 214. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984). 
 215. See Brian D. Smith, Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment—Good 
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 231, 243 (1995) (“Courts 
must balance the purposes of the good faith exception with the possible erosion of 
Fourth Amendment rights due to judicial and political abuse. The good faith 
exception cannot become a legal excuse for police to abuse inalienable rights to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 216. This inconsistency could arguably lead to some people, depending on 
where they reside, receiving greater constitutional protections than others.  
 217. This specific issue has been analyzed by scholars in the past, but with 
respect to a slighter amount of case law. The longer the circuit split perpetuates, 
the greater the issue becomes due to the introduction of new tests and approaches 
by the courts, and thus the urgency of the problem at hand increases. See 
generally Janine L. Hochberg, Dining in Good Faith on Poisonous Fruit? 15 
WIDENER L. REV. 301 (2009) (addressing the intersection of the good-faith 
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and become more drastic as additional tests are created by the 
courts.218 For instance, in 2013 the Fifth Circuit in United States 
v. Woerner219 applied the good-faith exception in a complex 
scenario where federal officers relied upon a search warrant that 
depended on evidence obtained by local police officers during 
execution of a search warrant that the local officers knew to be 
expired.220 Admission of evidence in this factual situation raises 
issues concerning parallel investigations previously unaddressed.  
Confronted with this same issue a year later, the Fifth Circuit 
in United States v. Massi221 purported to follow the Sixth Circuit 
ruling United States v. McClain.222 However, the Fifth Circuit 
applied the good-faith exception despite the fact that the same 
officers who committed the unconstitutional seizure applied for the 
warrant and conducted the search pursuant to it, while the Sixth 
Circuit in McClain specifically emphasized that the officers who 
conducted the search pursuant to the warrant were different than 
those who committed to original unconstitutional search.223 Thus, 
the issue remains unsettled and grows more exaggerated with 
time. In order to successfully influence police action, the Supreme 
Court must determine whether the good-faith exception can bar 
the admission of evidence in these instances, and if so, under what 
circumstances.224 Otherwise, inconsistent application will 
inevitably lead to unpredictable law enforcement and unequal 
                                                                                                     
exception and the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine prior to the rulings in Massi 
and Woerner); Clancy, supra note 205 (arguing that the good-faith exception 
should apply in these cases in order to encourage officers to obtain search 
warrants).  
 218. See supra Part III (outlining the various tests adopted by courts in 
dealing with the present issue). 
 219. 709 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 220. See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining the facts of Woerner in greater detail).  
 221. 761 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 222. 444 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 223. See id. at 566 (“More importantly, the officers who sought and executed 
the search warrants were not the same officers who performed the initial 
warrantless search . . . .”).  
 224. Because this issue has persisted for several years and the circuit courts’ 
perspectives grow further from each other with time, it seems extremely unlikely 
that the courts of appeal will ever reach a consensus. Thus, the Supreme Court 
should grant certiorari and directly address this narrow issue at the next 
available opportunity.  
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protection of citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights across the 
nation.225 
V. Resolution 
In order to resolve this pressing issue, this Note proposes the 
following test as a compromise between the various circuits. The 
good-faith exception should apply in cases where officers rely on a 
warrant containing tainted evidence only when: (1) the officers 
who executed the original unconstitutional search or seizure did so 
in good faith;226 (2) the officers who applied for the warrant and 
executed the search pursuant to it were not in any capacity the 
same officers who committed the initial unconstitutional act 
(unless certain specifically delineated circumstances are present); 
and (3) the officers relied on the warrant in good faith, based on 
Leon. To fully explain the proposed test, this Note will proceed by 
explaining each prong in detail and then addressing 
counterarguments.  
A. Good-Faith Execution of the Original Search or Seizure 
This element of the test highly resembles the Sixth Circuit’s 
first prong in United States v. McClain:227 the prior law 
enforcement conduct that uncovered evidence used in the affidavit 
for the warrant must be “close enough to the line of validity” that 
an objectively reasonable officer preparing the affidavit or 
executing the warrant would believe that the information 
supporting the warrant was not tainted by unconstitutional 
conduct.228 However, analysis under this proposed standard 
                                                                                                     
 225. See Robert C. Gleason, Application Problems Arising from the Good Faith 
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 773–74 (1987) 
(“Courts must interpret and apply the good faith exception accurately and in a 
uniform manner because the exception is related so closely to Fourth Amendment 
rights.”). 
 226. As previously noted, “good faith” in this context varies based on whether 
the original search or seizure was illegal in spite of a warrant, or illegal due to 
lack of a warrant. Supra note 12 and accompanying text.   
 227. 444 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 228. Id. at 563. 
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involves two separate requirements: (1) subjective good faith—the 
officers did not realize that their actions were unconstitutional; 
and (2) objective good faith—a reasonable officer may not have 
known the search or seizure was unconstitutional under the given 
circumstances.  
In order for the search to satisfy the subjective good faith 
prerequisite, the officers conducting the search must not have 
realized the illegality of their conduct. The officers in McClain 
would meet this standard because they believed their warrantless 
search was justified.229 In contrast, the police conduct in United 
States v. Woerner230 would not have satisfied the subjective good 
faith standard because they knew the warrant was expired and 
chose to conduct the search regardless.231 Thus, under the proposed 
test, a court’s analysis would stop here and uphold suppression of 
the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant relied upon under 
the circumstances of Woerner. The rationale for this requirement 
is as follows: If officers conduct a search in subjective bad faith, 
courts should suppress the evidence obtained as well as the fruits 
of such evidence because exclusion furthers the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule in this scenario—it deters conscious Fourth 
Amendment violations.232 The Ninth Circuit addressed this 
requirement in United States v. Vasey.233 The court in Vasey 
refused to apply the good-faith exception largely because the court 
believed that the officers did not act in good faith when obtaining 
the evidence.234 Thus, the court refused to apply the good-faith 
exception because application of the exclusionary rule would deter 
                                                                                                     
 229. Id. at 566.   
 230. 709 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 231. See note 73 and accompanying text (explaining the facts of Woerner). 
 232. See Diffendal, supra note 208, at 231–32 (“[T]he good-faith exception 
should be considered only after determining that the deterrent function would not 
be served.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984)  
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes 
that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, 
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing 
to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope 
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future 
counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused 
(quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)).  
 233. 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 234. See Part III.B.1 (discussing the court’s holding in Vasey).   
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intentionally unconstitutional police conduct under these 
circumstances.235  
The objective good faith prong of the proposed test looks 
similar to the “close enough to the line of validity” test used in 
McClain and subsequent case law.236 In order for a court to admit 
evidence under this standard, the initial search must have 
appeared objectively reasonable to a reasonable police officer.237 If 
another group of reasonable officers would have concluded that the 
act was unmistakably illegal, a court must suppress the fruits of 
this search.238 As stated by the Second Circuit in United States v. 
O’Neal,239 “If the method by which evidence supporting a search 
warrant is seized is clearly illegal,” the evidence obtained pursuant 
to the warrant must be suppressed.240 This particular problem 
largely led the Eleventh Circuit to reject application of the good-
faith exception in United States v. McGough.241 The court in 
McGough determined that the original warrantless search was not 
“objectively reasonable law enforcement activity,”242 and therefore 
refused to apply the good-faith exception and admit subsequently 
obtained evidence.243 Exclusion of evidence when officers should 
have objectively realized their actions were unconstitutional 
furthers the purpose of the exclusionary rule as it encourages 
education of law enforcement on Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                     
 235. See Vasey, 834 F.2d at 789–90 (“[A] magistrate’s consideration does not 
protect from exclusion evidence seized during a search under a warrant if that 
warrant was based on evidence seized in an unconstitutional search.”).   
 236. See, i.e., Part III.C.2 (describing this test as used by the Eighth Circuit 
in United States v. White). 
 237. This analysis resembles the standard used in Fourth Amendment 
excessive force jurisprudence. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 
(1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision 
of hindsight.”).  
 238. See Clancy, supra note 205, at 715 (contrasting this type of behavior with 
“substantial and deliberate conduct,” for which suppression should remain a 
remedy).  
 239. 17 F.3d 239 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 240. Id. at 243 n.6.  
 241. 412 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 242. Id. at 1240.   
 243. See Part III.B.2 (outlining the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in McGough).   
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requirements244 while also deterring individual unlawful 
conduct.245 
B. Different Groups of Officers Conducted the Searches 
This prong of the proposed test is relatively straight-forward. 
If an officer who committed the original unconstitutional search or 
seizure then applies for a warrant and conducts a search pursuant 
to it, evidence obtained from the second search must be suppressed 
unless the same officers disclosed all of the circumstances of the 
original search or seizure in adequately sufficient detail to the 
issuing magistrate. Ideally, the officer who conducted the 
warrantless search or seizure then passes along evidence obtained 
to another officer, who then applies for a subsequent warrant. In 
such cases, the evidence survives this part of the test.  
Therefore, in fact scenarios such as United States v. Massi246 
where the same group of officers who conducted the 
unconstitutional seizure filed the affidavit seeking a search 
warrant,247 courts must usually suppress evidence obtained 
pursuant to the second search. However, courts need not suppress 
evidence under this prong in circumstances like United States v. 
Woerner,248 where state police officers passed along information to 
federal agents who then applied for a search warrant based 
partially on the tainted information.249 The Sixth Circuit 
                                                                                                     
 244. See Diffendal, supra note 208, at 233  
[T]he application of the exclusionary rule in these cases must be 
analyzed with respect to its potential for causing widespread 
institutional deterrence. Not only would the individual officer who 
conducted the predicate illegal search be deterred, but the exclusion of 
the evidence would also enhance police departments’ knowledge and 
training regarding what constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation. As 
a result, other officers would be deterred. 
 245. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (noting that if 
exclusion could not influence a magistrate’s actions, it could only be justified by 
its ability to “alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the 
policies of their departments”).  
 246. 761 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 247. See notes 99–106 and accompanying text (outlining the facts in Massi). 
 248. 709 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 249. See Part III.A.2 (analyzing Woerner).   
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specifically emphasized this point in United States v. McClain,250 
noting that the officers who conducted the searches were 
completely different.251 This requirement solves the concern that 
officers will seek warrants in order to cleanse unconstitutional 
acts.252 If courts allowed law enforcement to commit an illegal 
search or seizure and then apply for a warrant based on 
information tainted by the unconstitutional act, it would 
perpetuate unlawful police conduct.253 Where the officers that 
conducted the unlawful search or seizure are in any capacity the 
same as those who applied for, or conducted, the search pursuant 
to the obtained warrant, the purpose of the exclusionary rule is 
served by suppression of the evidence.254  
However, as noted previously, an exception to this prong 
exists. In scenarios where the same officers conducted both 
searches, courts should admit the evidence if the officers disclosed 
all of the circumstances of the original search or seizure in 
adequately sufficient detail to the issuing magistrate.255 The 
presented affidavit cannot exclude any relevant aspects of the 
situation, meaning it cannot appear that the officers may have 
                                                                                                     
 250. 444 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 251. See id. at 566 (“More importantly, the officers who sought and executed 
the search warrants were not the same officers who performed the initial 
warrantless search, and Officer Murphy’s warrant affidavit fully disclosed to a 
neutral and detached magistrate the circumstances surrounding the initial 
warrantless search.”). 
 252. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (expressing the foregoing 
concern); see also Hochberg, supra note 217, at 319 (“Officers cannot cleanse the 
fruits of an illegal search or seizure simply by backtracking to obtain a warrant.”).  
 253. See Hochberg, supra note 217, at 319 (“The warrant process can only 
perpetuate, not attenuate, the taint of a Fourth Amendment violation.”). 
 254. Since its ruling in Leon, the Supreme Court has been more likely to apply 
the exclusionary rule in cases of highly culpable police conduct. See Herring v. 
United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702–04 (2009) (noting that cases in which the 
Supreme Court had applied the exclusionary rule, the actions portrayed 
“intentional conduct that was patently unconstitutional”). Thus, in cases such as 
the foregoing fact scenario that imply intentional misconduct by police officers, 
the Court would likely exclude the obtained evidence. 
 255. See Clancy, supra note 205, at 714 (“There can be no good faith reliance 
if important facts that would change the determination of whether the prior 
warrantless activities were legal are not disclosed. . . . [A]n officer cannot rely on 
the magistrate’s assessment of the legality of pre-warrant activities if those 
activities have not been presented for review.”). 
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possibly intended to mislead the magistrate.256 This exception 
highly resembles the Second Circuit’s analysis in United States v. 
Reilly.257 In Reilly, the court suppressed evidence partially due to 
the inadequacy of information presented to the magistrate.258 The 
officers who committed the unconstitutional search did not 
describe their actions in sufficient detail.259 Without information 
concerning the lay of the land and the officer’s actions, the court 
determined that the magistrate “could not possibly make a valid 
assessment of the legality of the warrant that he was asked to 
issue.”260 This analysis bears a resemblance to Leon’s “facially 
deficient” warrant exception,261 but is a heightened standard. 
Under the proposed test, affidavits require greater detail than 
what is expected under more ideal circumstances when different 
officers conducted the unconstitutional search and the search 
pursuant to the issued warrant. Courts should carefully evaluate 
the amount of detail presented to the magistrate when the same 
officers commit the original unconstitutional act and apply for the 
search warrant.262  
C. Good-Faith Reliance Under Leon 
Last, once a court determines that the prior two prongs have 
been satisfied, it must analyze the situation under the Leon good-
faith standard.263 If the groups of police officers are entirely 
                                                                                                     
 256. See id. (“Thus, consistent with Leon, suppression would remain a remedy 
when the officer’s warrantless seizure was so lacking in justification as to render 
the officer’s belief in its existence to be entirely unreasonable.”). 
 257. 76 F.3d 1271 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 258. See Part III.C.1 (outlining the facts of Reilly).   
 259. See Part III.C.1 (describing the court’s dissatisfaction with the officers’ 
presented affidavit).   
 260. See Reilly, at 1273 (“Here, information about the distances involved, the 
layout, conditions, and other like particulars of Reilly’s land was crucial.”).   
 261. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (delineating this scenario 
where the good-faith exception should not be applied under Leon).    
 262. This requirement of heightened scrutiny reflects concerns that officers 
would use a neutral magistrate to rectify their prior unconstitutional search or 
seizure. If the same officers act in true good faith, and the original search or 
seizure was close to the line of validity, then they should not hesitate to provide 
the magistrate with an extraordinarily detailed account of their prior search.  
 263. See Part II.C (detailing the good-faith exception established in Leon).   
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distinct—as preferred under this standard—two additional 
requirements must be met in order for the good-faith exception to 
apply. First, the information serving as the basis for the warrant 
must have been passed to the next group of officers in good faith.264 
The police officers who committed the initial search or seizure still 
must not have known that their actions were unconstitutional at 
the time they presented other law enforcement officials with the 
information, and a reasonable officer would not have known the 
actions were unconstitutional under the circumstances.265 Second, 
the information also must have been received in good faith. The 
officers who gained information from the prior search must not 
have known that the information was tainted, and a reasonable 
officer could not have realized that it was based on 
unconstitutionally obtained information. Like the Second Circuit’s 
standard adopted in Reilly,266 it matters whether or not the 
warrant was received in good faith, not only relied upon in good 
faith.267 
The officers who conducted the search must have reasonably 
relied upon the warrant and did not suspect that the warrant was 
tainted.268 Under Leon, the issue involves “whether a reasonably 
well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal 
despite the magistrate’s authorization.”269 A court must consider 
“all of the circumstances” and assume that the officer has “a 
reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.”270 Additionally, 
none of the four exceptions to application of the good-faith 
                                                                                                     
 264. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 n.24 (1984) (“Nothing in our 
opinion suggests, for example, that an officer could obtain a warrant on the basis 
of a ‘bare bones’ affidavit and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the 
circumstances under which the warrant was obtained to conduct the search.”). 
 265. This standard of reasonableness is the same as under prong one of the 
proposed test. See supra note 237 (noting that reasonableness should be judged 
from the perspective of an officer on the scene).   
 266. See Part III.C.1 (explaining the Second Circuit’s standard used in Reilly). 
 267. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (outlining this notion as 
stated by the court in Reilly).  
 268.  James P. Fleissner, Glide Path to an “Inclusionary Rule”: How 
Expansion of the Good Faith Exception Threatens to Fundamentally Change the 
Exclusionary Rule, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1023, 1032 (1997) (“This means that the 
warrant presented to the magistrate for review must be one that a reasonably 
well trained officer could believe to be based on probable cause.”).  
 269. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23.   
 270. Id. at 919 n.20.   
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exception may be present.271 If the magistrate was misled by 
information in the officer’s affidavit, courts should suppress the 
evidence.272 If the magistrate “wholly abandoned his judicial role,” 
courts should suppress the evidence.273 If the warrant was so 
deficient that the officers who conducted the search pursuant to it 
could not have thought it was valid, courts should suppress the 
evidence.274 And lastly, if the affidavit presented to the magistrate 
completely lacked sufficient information to establish probable 
cause, courts should suppress the evidence.275 If, however, none of 
these exceptions from Leon apply to the case at hand, and the prior 
two prongs under this proposed test have been satisfied, the court 
should admit the evidence under the good-faith exception.  
D. Counterarguments 
Though the foregoing proposed standard embodies an 
arguably ideal combination of existing tests, some scholars could 
undoubtedly raise issues concerning its application. Firstly, the 
proposed test appears excessively complicated on its face. Legal 
minds generally agree that Fourth Amendment standards must be 
simple in order to achieve their purported goals.276 As stated by 
Wayne LaFave, “[S]ecurity [from unreasonable searches and 
seizures] can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of 
rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct 
determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is 
justified in the interest of law enforcement.”277 Thus, some might 
                                                                                                     
 271. Id. at 923.   
 272. Id.   
 273. Id.  
 274. Id. 
 275. Id.  
 276. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 375 (1974) (“The problem . . . in 
shaping . . . the law of the fourth amendment is that the variety of situations with 
which [it] deal[s] is mindboggling. . . . [But] if some categorization is not 
done . . . then we shall have a fourth amendment with all of the character and 
consistency of a Rorschach blot.”). 
 277. Wayne LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized 
Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142 (1974). 
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say that the foregoing standard would prove ineffective because it 
would be difficult for law enforcement to follow.  
However, the proposed test can be boiled down to one simple 
notion: Good faith is required at every step of the process. During 
the initial search or seizure, during the transmission of 
information between officers, during application for a warrant, and 
during the search pursuant to the warrant, officers must act in 
good faith. Although the details of the test seem complex, police 
officers must simply know established Fourth Amendment 
requirements and act in good faith at all times. Therefore, the 
standard would encourage in-depth law enforcement training in 
this area278 and compel each individual officer to act in good faith 
at every juncture of his job. Additionally, as noted by Kenneth 
Halcom in defense of his proposed standard in this area, the 
foregoing proposal does not alter substantive Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.279 The proposed test does not change the current 
standard regarding the legality of searches and seizures, but 
rather, “is a device for guiding the ex post facto analysis of trial 
judges.”280 Therefore, “the amount and type of knowledge required 
of the ordinary police officer does not change one whit under this 
proposal.”281 Although Halcom’s proposed standard differs 
substantially from the instant test,282 his response to this 
                                                                                                     
 278. Studies have shown that application of the exclusionary rule—and 
consequently the exclusion of evidence under the proposed standard—has led to 
more extensive law enforcement education. See L. Timothy Perrina, H. Mitchell 
Caldwell, Carol A. Chase & Ronald W. Fagan, If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond 
the Exclusionary Rule: A New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary 
Rule and a Call for a Civil Administrative Remedy to Partially Replace the Rule, 
83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 671–73 (1998) (“At a minimum, the rule has led to some 
additional officer training concerning the law of search and seizure. Additionally, 
there is evidence that officers have developed a greater preference for search 
warrants after Mapp.”); Orfield, supra note 28, at 1017 (“This 
study . . . documents the exclusionary rule’s significant deterrent effects. On an 
institutional level, the rule has changed police, prosecutorial, and judicial 
procedures; on an individual level, it has educated police officers in the 
requirements of the fourth amendment and has punished them when they have 
violated those requirements.”). 
 279. Kenneth C. Halcom, Illegal Predicate Searches and the Good-Faith 
Exception, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 467, 495 (2007). 
 280. Id. at 495–96.   
 281. Id. at 496.  
 282. Halcom’s proposed test consists of three simple steps: (1) “Was there an 
illegal predicate search?” (2) “Would the warrant be supported by probable cause 
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counterargument proves relevant for this Note’s argument as well. 
Although the proposed test appears complex at first glance, it does 
not change the substantive law that police officers are bound to 
follow.  
Also, one could argue that the rule is overly complicated and 
consequently difficult for courts to apply. However, the standard 
must be specific enough to deal with the fact-determinative nature 
of the issue at hand. It must have the capability to address an 
infinite combination of circumstances.283 When permitting an 
expansion of an exception to the exclusionary rule, courts should 
be required to conduct an in-depth factual analysis.284 Current 
standards, such as the one used by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, 
are overly vague and do not sufficiently protect citizens’ Fourth 
Amendment rights. The proposed rule mandates an appropriately 
detailed analysis in the most straightforward manner feasible. The 
rule’s three prongs advance in chronological order and are 
organized in a rational manner. The proposed standard could 
easily be translated into a flowchart or checklist. Therefore, it is 
complex enough to address all possible scenarios while 
simultaneously methodical enough for courts to apply it with 
general ease.  
One could also contend that the good-faith exception should 
simply not be applied in this scenario.285 Some authors have 
                                                                                                     
apart from the fruits of the illegal predicate search?” and (3) “Could the 
diminished warrant application have supported good faith reliance?” Id. at 492–
93. According to Halcom, the key question is: “Had the illegally obtained evidence 
never been presented to the magistrate, would an officer have been reasonable to 
accept the magistrate’s judgment that the application established probable 
cause?” Id. at 493. Though Halcom addresses some concerns involved in 
application of the good-faith exception in these scenarios, it presents an overly 
simplified solution. 
 283. Previously discussed case law demonstrates the variety of these factual 
scenarios. See supra Part III (highlighting the various circumstances under which 
this issue arises). 
 284. Many scholars have warned of the potential negative effects stemming 
from expansion of exceptions to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Fleissner, supra 
note 268, at 1024 (“[Embracing] the arguments for extending the holding of 
Leon . . . would seriously undermine the protections of the Constitution by 
eliminating incentives for the law enforcement establishment to properly train 
officers and for individual officers to adhere strictly to the directives of that 
training.”).  
 285. See Diffendal, supra note 208, at 230 (“In comparing the divergent 
rationales of courts considering extension of the good-faith exception, it appears 
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asserted that reliance on warrants tainted by an unconstitutional 
search or seizure is the type of behavior the exclusionary rule is 
meant to deter, and thus the good-faith exception should not apply 
at all.286 While this would be a much simpler solution, the 
situations at issue do not encompass the type of behavior the 
exclusionary rule is meant to deter.287 When each officer 
throughout the investigation has acted in good faith, and the only 
flaws in the process are the unintentional unconstitutional search 
or seizure and the magistrate’s issuance of a warrant on that basis, 
exclusion of evidence in no way deters unreasonable police 
behavior. Also, the absolute exclusion of evidence in each of these 
situations does not reflect a proper balance between protection 
against unlawful searches and seizures and effective police 
enforcement. Such a bar leans too far towards the first interest 
while unduly harming the second. 
VI. Conclusion 
The issue of whether the good-faith exception saves evidence 
from exclusion when the warrant relied upon is based on an 
unconstitutional act has important practical effects.288 If the 
evidence is admitted in some of these scenarios, law enforcement 
could begin to assume that warrants cleanse prior unconstitutional 
actions, thus allowing illegal warrantless searches to continue and 
increase in frequency.289 If evidence is excluded in each of these 
situations, law enforcement would be unreasonably crippled and 
                                                                                                     
that those courts refusing to expand the exception present reasoning more firmly 
grounded in the principles advanced in Leon than that of courts favoring 
extension.”). 
 286. See Hochberg, supra note 217, at 310 (arguing that the good-faith 
exception should never apply in these cases). 
 287. Authors who endorse a complete bar of the good-faith exception in these 
cases assume that the illegal search could be deterred. See Diffendal, supra note 
208, at 238 (“[I]n the case of a predicate illegal search, there is by definition 
conduct to deter and prevent.”). However, when the officers reasonably 
interpreted the initial search or seizure as constitutional, deterrence from 
exclusion of the evidence is impossible.  
 288. See supra Part IV (explaining the significance of this issue in practice).  
 289. See supra notes 202–03 and accompanying text (expressing the concern 
that officers will use warrants to sanitize prior unconstitutional behavior).  
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objective good faith would be punished.290 The current 
disagreement among courts of appeal concerning whether the 
exception applies presumably leads to inconsistent police 
behavior.291 By allowing good faith to sustain evidence in some 
jurisdictions but not in others, citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights 
are unevenly protected and law enforcement is unevenly 
hampered. Thus, it is exceedingly important that the Supreme 
Court adopt a uniform standard to confront this novel legal issue 
in order to consistently protect citizens’ individual liberties under 
the Fourth Amendment and promote uniform, efficient police 
enforcement.  
This Note’s proposed solution promotes these two interests 
and solves unpredictability issues. It requires good faith at every 
step of the process and therefore allows admission of evidence only 
when deterrence of unlawful police conduct is unattainable. Good 
faith must permeate every aspect of the investigation: during 
execution of the original search or seizure, during transmission of 
information to other law enforcement officials, during the filing of 
an affidavit with a neutral magistrate, and during execution of the 
obtained search warrant. The foregoing test is specific enough that 
courts can consistently apply it in a variety of factual scenarios. It 
promotes the goal of deterring unlawful police conduct by 
excluding evidence obtained pursuant to any act of bad faith on the 
part of law enforcement. The proposed test therefore strikes the 
ideal balance between deterring unlawful police conduct and 
allowing efficient law enforcement when committed in good 
faith.292 Therefore, the Court should adopt a similar proposal at 
the next appropriate opportunity to end the inevitable 
unpredictability stemming from the present circuit split. 
                                                                                                     
 290.  See supra note 213 and accompanying text (noting that the application 
of the exclusionary rule in cases of good-faith reliance would only deter officers 
from fulfilling their duties). 
 291. See supra note 225 (noting that uneven application of the good-faith 
exception leads to unequal protection of citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights).  
 292. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (asserting that both the 
exclusionary rule and the good-faith exception aim to achieve balance between 
these two competing interests).  
